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Interaction studies in Japanese primatology: Their scope, uniqueness, 
and the future 
 
Michio Nakamura 
Wildlife Research Center, Kyoto University 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to review social interaction studies in Japanese primatology, in order to introduce their utility into the 
current framework of primatology and their potential for understanding primate sociality. In the first part, I introduce 
some of the achievements in the field of Japanese primatology. It is a well-known fact that Japanese primatology, in 
its initial phases, strongly focused on society and sociality in nonhuman primates with respect to human society and 
sociality. Although Jun’ichiro Itani’s theory on the evolution of social structure significantly influenced some of the 
Japanese primatologists, it had a comparatively minor impact on the West. As Itani himself admitted, he only treated 
the so-called “hardware” of society and did not deal with its “software” comprehensively, although he understood its 
importance and even provided some insightful ideas. In the latter part of the paper, I introduce some of the studies 
that directly dealt with the social interactions of primates and that were written mostly in Japanese. As compared to 
works in standard primatology, many of these papers were descriptive. This is because interaction cannot be decom-
posed into individual behaviors; thus, we have to focus on interaction itself. Finally, I argue that we need to explore 
the methodology for describing the lively and dynamic aspects of primate sociality. 
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Why Primates Interest Us 
 
 Imagine a child visiting a zoo with his parents. He 
looks into the monkey enclosure and is attracted to 
what he sees there. Monkeys and apes always interest a 
novice. It appears that the monkeys’ social interactions 
instantly attract children toward them. The child neither 
knows about the social structure of the monkey species 
nor does he know how a particular behavior can be 
adaptive or beneficial in the sociobiological sense. 
Therefore, it is not such knowledge that makes the 
monkeys’ interactions appear interesting to him. Al-
though they may notice that monkeys are somewhat 
similar to humans, children do not know and are not 
concerned about whether monkeys are taxonomically or 
genetically close to humans. Of course, for professional 
researchers, the structured societies of primates or be-
haviors that can be suitably and parsimoniously ex-
plained using individual reproductive strategies are the 
attractive features for academics. However, this does 
not imply that the sociality of primates is not under-
standable or interesting without such current academic 
frameworks. Researchers do (or did) have the same 
naïve interest as that of the child mentioned above, and 
this initial interest could be a possible reason their de-
ciding to become primatologists. However, as scientists, 
they can no longer pursue the same naïve interest; 
rather, they have to place themselves in the current 
academic frameworks. 
 Nevertheless, I believe that such a naïve interest 
should not be abandoned. It is important for researchers 
to visit the field in order to gain first-hand impressions. 
However, may they report the vivid impressions they 
actually observe in nature? Do primatologists actually 
focus on interesting aspects of primates, such as their 
lively social interactions, which even a child immedi-
ately notices? In other words, can primatologists write 
“ethnographies” about target species or societies in the 
same manner that anthropologists write about their 
targets? The answer can be both yes and no. It is “yes” 
because early primatologists wrote “ethnographies” in 
the form of books for general public (e.g., Itani 1954; 
Goodall 1971; Nishida 1973). In such books, the lively 
interactions of monkeys and apes were vividly de-
scribed and still retain their brilliance. Although it is 
easy to say that these earlier descriptions were not 
purely academic or scientific, it is true that such classic 
primate “ethnographies” help us understand the reality 
of the social world of monkeys and apes even beyond 
species (Sugawara 2002). The answer is “no” because 
 today, this method of describing primate behaviors is 
becoming devalued. At the very least, the methodology 
that observes and describes the actual behaviors of 
monkeys and apes now seems to be regarded as 
old-fashioned or even nonscientific. Now, researchers 
have to define and to categorize behavioral patterns in 
order to make them suitable for statistical testing and 
sometimes they provide only statistical values in their 
scientific papers. I sometimes face difficulties in under-
standing a particular categorized behavior, because 
authors only summarize the subtle variations to a single 
behavioral category and seldom provide a rational ex-
planation for such categorization. In such cases, it can 
be said that the reality of the particular behavior is lost. 
 Although lively social interactions are not limited 
to primates, it is often easier to observe and record such 
interactions in primates than in other animals because 
most primates live in gregarious and stable social 
groups usually terrestrial (as opposed to aquatic) and 
diurnal. This paper provides an overview of the history 
of Japanese primatology from the standpoint that the 
fascinating aspect of primate sociality lies in their vivid 
social interactions. I will mainly review the published 
literature on primate societies and social interactions 
written in Japanese. There are three reasons for this: 
First, this special issue of Primates is meant to com-
memorate the 60th anniversary of Japanese primatol-
ogy; thus, it is appropriate to focus on this field. Second, 
as a native Japanese speaker, I am aware that papers 
written only in Japanese or papers that can only be 
expressed in Japanese contain unique ideas and impor-
tant observations. I will not be able to introduce all the 
ideas that even their original authors could not express 
in English; however, it will still be useful to introduce 
these ideas at least to some extent. Third, studies based 
on such detailed descriptions of social interactions are 
mostly written in Japanese (or in English by Japanese 
primatologists). This may be because, as is often 
pointed out (e.g., Asquith 2000; Takasaki 2000), Japa-
nese (particularly traditional Japanese) primatology and 
Western primatology adopted rather different ap-
proaches (but see McGrew (2007) who emphasized the 
links rather than differences between Japanese and 
Western primatology). Today, many Japanese research-
ers adopt the Western approach, perhaps because the 
Japanese academic world now requires them to write 
papers in international journals. Ideally, the quality of a 
study should not be judged by the language in which it 
is written but instead purely by its content. However, in 
Japan, it is often assumed that a paper published in an 
English journal is superior to that published in a Japa-
nese one (of course, the citation index is usually higher 
in the former owing to its wider readership). Thus, 
young Japanese researchers avoid such Japanese ap-
proaches and intentionally or unintentionally adopt the 
Western approach, which is more readily accepted in 
international journals. 
 Theoretical background of Japanese primatology, 
especially the focus on sociology of primates, is often 
attributed to Kinji Imanishi (e.g., 1941, 1951, 1966) 
and his ideas have been relatively well introduced in 
English language (e.g., de Waal 2001, 2003; Asquith 
2002; Nakamura and Nishida 2006; Matsuzawa and 
McGrew 2008). Therefore, in order to avoid repetition, 
I mention little about Imanishi’s ideas but instead start 
from discourse made by Jun’ichiro Itani whose ideas 
have been relatively less introduced to English reader-
ship. Some, or maybe majority, of Japanese primatolo-
gists may not be completely happy with my under-
standing of the history on Japanese primatology and its 
interpretation. However, in the context of social inter-
action studies, I believe my standpoint will provide 
some useful insights to the future research perspectives. 
 
 
Achievements in the Field of Early Japanese Pri-
matology 
 
 When research began to be undertaken in the field 
of Japanese primatology, understanding societies or 
sociality was the most important objective (Imanishi 
1957; Itani 1985a). It is often said that traditional Japa-
nese primatology was concerned with sociology rather 
than biology (e.g., Muroyama 1998). Although some 
Japanese researchers have given more weight to biol-
ogy (e.g., Sugiyama 2000), many primatologists, par-
ticularly those from the Kyoto School (sensu Takasaki 
2000), attempted to understand the societies of living 
things without limiting their methodology to purely 
biological concerns. The following statement by Iman-
ishi appropriately indicates the situation: “What I want 
to conduct is research on the historicity of animal so-
cieties that can only be understood by accumulating 
thorough records. Such records can only be obtained by 
describing the dynamism of the societies in place of the 
animals themselves who do not have language or letters 
to do so” (Imanishi 1960, my translation). 
 One of the well-known achievements in the field of 
Japanese primatology that is recognized worldwide is 
the prediction and discovery of primate cultures (Iman-
ishi 1952; Kawamura 1959; Kawai 1965; Itani and 
Nishimura 1973; Nishida 1987; also see Nakamura and 
Nishida 2006 for a review). Such early studies on pri-
mate culture are highly praised by Western primatolo-
gists (de Waal 2001; McGrew 2004), and the famous 
paper on sweet potato washing (Kawai 1965) is often 
cited by Western researchers even today (e.g., van 
Schaik et al. 1999; Rendell and Whitehead 2001; 
Boesch 2003). 
 Apart from such well-recognized achievements, 
studies on the evolution of primate social structures by 
Itani (1977, 1980a, 1981, 1987), who emphasized the 
importance of phylogeny and some type of fundamental 
“rules” or “institutions” for societies, had a certain 
influence to some Japanese primatologists (e.g., 
Yamagiwa 1994; Furuichi 1999; Kuroda 1999); how-
ever, they did not seem to get much attention in the 
West although some part of the idea was also published 
in English (Itani 1977, 1985b). Itani’s discussions on 
primate social structure both influenced and were in-
fluenced by the elucidation of the social structures of 
great apes by some Japanese researchers (Nishida 1968; 
 Kuroda 1979; Sugiyama and Koman 1979; Kano 
1982). 
 Itani’s methodology, which discusses the evolu-
tionary pathway by understanding society as a structure 
using basic data such as group composition, number of 
group members, and the transferring sex, became a 
trend at least in Japan. Many Japanese primatologists 
once devoted themselves to the search for primate so-
cial structures and their evolution. Although this trend 
declined with the rise of socioecology, some research-
ers still try to develop Itani’s theory on the evolution of 
social structure within the framework of socioecology 
(e.g., Yamagiwa 1999; Furuichi 2006). 
 Itani’s theory on social structure superficially re-
sembles current socioecology in some aspects such that 
both grasp a society as a structure in relation to the 
spatiotemporal dispersal pattern of different sexes, but 
differs in others. In socioecology, social organization is 
regarded as the outcome of the strategies employed by 
individuals to meet their basic requirements and can be 
regarded as an instrument used by individuals that 
achieves the social structure (Wrangham 1980; van 
Schaik and van Hooff 1983; Sterck et al. 1997). On the 
other hand, Itani’s social structure is more group-based 
and phylogenetic continuity and group “heredity” (i.e., 
transgenerational conservation of characteristics of a 
society) are considered to be important.  
 Following the rise of socioecology, there were cri-
tiques that phylogeny has to be considered in addition 
to current ecological factors (Rendall and Di Fiore 
1995; Foley 1996). Although Itani had emphasized the 
importance of phylogeny with respect to social struc-
tures more than 15 years before, Western scholars did 




“Software” of Society and Anti-structure 
 
 As mentioned above, although social structure the-
ory was once dominant in sociological studies of pri-
mates in Japan, a slightly different movement began in 
the period from the late 1970s to the 1980s. This period 
corresponds to that when Itani basically had completed 
his work on primate social structure and shifted his 
main interest to studies of the ecological anthropology 
of farmers, hunter-gatherers, and pastoralists who were 
still considerably dependent on nature (e.g., Itani 
1980b). Some young researchers and students studying 
nonhuman primates began to target social interaction 
itself rather than social structure as the main theme of 
their studies. Itani (1988) once dubbed this small group 
of people an “Interaction School”, himself not being 
directly involved in it. 
 Moreover, Itani himself admitted that although he 
had been studying the so-called “hardware” of society, 
further research on the “software” of society was re-
quired thereafter (Itani 1987). Here by “hardware” he 
meant structure of a society, and by “software” behav-
iors and social interactions that make co-existence of 
individuals possible and that make the social structure. 
Although his main discussions on primate societies 
concerned hardware, he sometimes also discussed the 
software of society; one such discussion was “Dis-
course on the Origin of Equality” (Itani 1986), which 
dealt with the equality and inequality in the society of 
primates, including humans. This work was definitely 
inspired by “Discourse on the Origin of Inequality” by 
Rousseau (1755). As is widely known, Rousseau ar-
gued that all primitive natural men were equal and 
anonymous; social inequality then followed as society 
evolved. Using the knowledge obtained from primate 
studies at that time, Itani argued that Rousseau’s con-
cept of initial equality should be traced back to ele-
mental societies of nonhumans, such as those of soli-
tary prosimians, and termed such societies those of 
“equipotency.” This type of society is based on indi-
viduals who avoid each other and was the prior stage to 
the societies that ensured equality and inequality 
through social interactions. As the next step, he consid-
ered a pair type of social unit that can be found in vari-
ous clades of primates and termed it a society of “pris-
tine equality.” Societies with a larger group size and 
with female philopatry, such as those of Japanese ma-
caques, were regarded as societies of “pristine inequal-
ity.” This type of society, Itani argued, was based on the 
principle of matrilineal kinship and strict domi-
nant-subordinate interactions. In such pristine inequal-
ity, when individuals act as if such inequality does not 
exist, “conditional equality” emerges. Good examples 
of such conditional equality are observed in social play 
or food sharing in great apes (Itani 1986). 
 Another important but lesser known discourse on 
the software of society by Itani was “Behaviors that 
Make Social Structure” (Itani 1981). In this paper, he 
first admitted that any behavior can be described only 
by using language, and by analyzing the verbs used in 
the primatological literature, he classified eight strata of 
behaviors (brief English introduction by Nakamura, in 
press). Itani emphasized that affirmative/negative and 
active/passive forms of a verb “forgive”, i.e., a quadrant 
of “forgive/not forgive/be forgiven/be not forgiven” 
were critically important in the formation of social 
structure (it should be noted that the equivalent Japa-
nese verb for “forgive” also have a nuance of “toler-
ate”). 
 Another important concept that is relevant but can-
not really be categorized as software is “anti-structure” 
(Itani 1991). This concept can be used with reference to 
solitary males among Japanese monkeys (Nishida 
1966) or all-male groups of gorillas (Yamagiwa 1987), 
which is in contrast to the gregarious and 
well-structured (as observed in the dominance hierar-
chy) nature of bisexual groups. After focusing on the 
structure of primate societies, Itani later stated that an 
individual primate can move from structure to 
anti-structure and then back to structure; therefore, 
structure and anti-structure should be regarded as a 
whole set in the context of the formation of a society of 
one species. This idea is important in that Itani under-
stood that his discourse on social structure was not 
completed and required another dimension. 
  As discussed earlier, Itani, who had one of the sig-
nificant influences on the theoretical aspect of Japanese 
primatology after Kinji Imanishi, pointed out the im-
portance of software, although he mostly devoted his 
works to tracing the evolution of the hardware of soci-
ety or the social structure. Barring the fine-grained 
descriptions of Japanese monkeys in the early period 
(e.g., Itani 1954), he conducted no study of social in-
teractions of primates by himself. However, he shifted 
to studies of ecological anthropology and later to a 
macroscopic study on African vegetation in relation to 
human evolution (Itani and Terashima 2001). 
 
 
What is Interaction? 
 
 In current studies in primatology, the terms “social 
interaction,” “social relationships,” and “social struc-
ture” mostly are used according to the formulation by 
Hinde (1976), in which multiple interactions form a 
relationship and multiple relationships create a structure. 
Therefore, interaction between two individuals is the 
basic element of a social structure. Hinde also empha-
sized the necessity of generalization with regard to the 
same characteristics and search for principles in order 
to provide causal or functional explanations. He stated 
that “interactions need be considered only briefly,” and 
he formulated social interactions simply as “A does X 
to B” or “A does X to B and B responds with Y.” 
 In the usual usage of the word, interaction is “a 
kind of action that occurs as two or more objects have 
an effect upon one another” (Wikipedia 2008a), where 
the objects do not have to be living organisms. In soci-
ology, the usage of “social interaction” changes slightly, 
for instance, it can refer to “a dynamic, changing se-
quence of social actions between individuals who mod-
ify their actions and reactions according to the actions 
by their interaction partner” (Wikipedia 2008b). From 
this definition, it is understood that social interaction 
comprises two or more actions (≈ behaviors); however, 
it cannot be decomposed into actions. More precisely, 
the very nature of an interaction cannot be understood 
if we decompose it into actions. Therefore, in order to 
study interactions, we have to target interaction as a 
whole set. An individual’s mental state (e.g., motivation 
or intention), physiological state (e.g., hormones), or 
genetic background for a particular action or behavior 
is definitely related to the occurrence of an interaction. 
However, the nature of interaction cannot be under-
stood by classifying it into such different lower levels. 
 Although Hinde (1976) also pointed this out by 
stating that “it has properties that are not present in the 
behavior of either participant alone,” his above formu-
lation appears to merely cover social behavior rather 
than social interaction because “does X” can be attrib-
uted to the responsibility of individual A, while B can 
only be a passive recipient. Additionally, the first for-
mulation only includes a one-way action from A to B 
and does not include B’s reaction. Even if B’s reaction 
Y is included, it only appears to be an interchange of 
behaviors. Therefore, this formulation does not seem to 
be good enough. 
 However, it is not easy to formulate such interac-
tion in a simple manner. The interaction between A and 
B may be described as follows: 
 
“...A does X to B, B does Y to A in relevance to X, A 
does Z to B in relevance to Y...” 
 
 The important point here is that the sum of X, Y, 
and Z can never represent the complete interaction. 
Although we have to extract some fragment of a dy-
namically changing interaction in order to record or 
describe it, that part cannot be independent from the 
background. Moreover, it is important to note that X, Y, 
and Z do not have to be a causal chain nor do they have 
to linearly proceed in this order. Even when A does X, 
B does not always have to do Y. The occurrence of X 
may affect that of Y only in such a way that X narrows 
the relevant actions following it, and there is always the 
possibility that an action other than Y will be performed 
in place of Y. 
 The indecomposability of a social interaction into 
actions may be related to the holistic idea of Japanese 
primatology in its earlier phase (e.g., Kuroda 1986; 
Takasaki 1999). Although the level is different, a soci-
ety itself has a holistic characteristic that cannot be 
understood by decomposing it to lower levels. This is in 
contrast with Hinde’s (1976) idea that the social struc-
ture can be decomposed to lower elements. Because the 
standard of Western natural science basically relates to 
decomposing the world to some elements in order to 
understand it, such a holistic view may not be accept-
able in the mainstream of primatology, which focuses 
on biology (biological anthropology, behavioral ecol-
ogy, etc.), a subdivision of natural science. There seems 
to be a general tendency that Westerners see a “tree” 
while Asians see a “forest” (Nisbett 2003). This differ-
ence merely corresponds to two different aspects of one 
phenomenon and neither is superior to the other. How-
ever, in Japanese primatology, following the introduc-
tion of sociobiology, several researchers began to ques-
tion this holistic view of early Japanese primatology 
(e.g., Sawaguchi and Kudo 1987). Many of these re-
searchers now attempt to only see a “tree,” as if the 
Western way of looking at nature is the only correct 
way. 
 It is now widely recognized that the phenomenona 
occurring in complex systems cannot simply be de-
composed to lower levels (e.g., Kauffman 1995). An 
alternative approach to reductionism is needed for such 
complex systems, although it is sometimes difficult to 
develop such an approach. Anyone who studies pri-
mates probably would agree that primate society is a 
complex system. Such views that regard the holistic 
aspects of sociality are slowly gaining acceptance as a 
result of the recent increase in interest in primate cul-
tures. Although it is obvious that an individual plays a 
role in the formation of culture, this does not imply that 
a culture can be decomposed to individual behaviors. 
The actions of an individual cannot be termed as cul-
ture; rather, the term can be applied to the collective 





 Although an interaction has holistic and noncausal 
characteristics, it is still observable. This is in contrast 
to the fact that a social relationship or a social structure 
can never be observed directly. A relationship or a 
structure is a conceptual scheme that observers abstract 
and construct after the accumulation of behavioral data 
or interactions over time. Therefore, observers inevita-
bly dissect the ever-changing social world within a 
time-frame in order to determine the status of relation-
ships and structures. 
 A dominant-subordinate relationship can, for ex-
ample, be observed in the case of individual A con-
tinuously showing subordination to individual B (as in 
the pant grunting of chimpanzees: Bygott 1979). Usu-
ally, we do not use the term dominant-subordinate rela-
tionship if there is only one occasion of subordinate 
behavior by A toward B, because it is possible that on 
other occasions, B might show subordination to A or 
otherwise, dominance among A and B is ambiguous (it 
may depend on situations). Therefore, we need a de-
fined time-frame in order to abstract such a relation-
ship; however, the decision regarding the time span 
usually depends on the observer. We shall consider the 
following example: 
 
  Period 1: A shows subordination to B. 
  Period 2: B shows subordination to A. 
  Period 3: A shows subordination to B. 
 
 If each period is, for instance, 10 minutes long, we 
will tend to think that there is no stable relationship 
between the two (the dominant-subordinate relationship 
is ambiguous). However, if each period is several years 
long, we will then observe the stable relationship within 
each period and say that reversals of the domi-
nant-subordinate relationship have occurred. This sim-
ple example shows that we need some time-frame in 
order to abstract relationships; however, the basis for 
this time frame is arbitrarily fixed. 
 The same observation can be made with regard to 
whether the relationship has changed or no relationship 
has been established at all. In this sense, a relationship 
is not a phenomenon that we can directly observe but a 
conceptual construction by the observer. There could be 
a counter-argument that there is no such problem if the 
definition of the time period is set prior to observation. 
It is true that with such definition, we can determine 
when to dissect our data; however, this does not help 
solve this problem because such definition for a rela-
tionship can only be arbitrarily fixed by the researcher. 
 The above discussion is also true for social struc-
ture. Structure is not an observable phenomenon; rather, 
it is only identified by an observer on the basis of 
changing membership and interactions among indi-
viduals within a particular time-span. 
 Interaction also needs a time-span in order to be 
identified and the method of setting this time-frame 
again depends on the observer. However, interaction is 
different from the above two concepts in that it can be 
observed continuously by an observer when it is occur-
ring; further, it cannot be understood unless such ob-
servation is conducted. Therefore, the only phenome-
non observable to the observer in reality is each inter-
action, and it is the observer who measures such inter-
actions by assuming that different interactions occur at 
different times and that they are of the “same” type. 
 It seems to me that in current primatology, terms 
such as social relationships or structure are easily 
adopted without thorough consideration of what the 
earlier researchers abstracted from their observations. It 
may not be wise to consider the implications of the 
terms or the authors’ intent of the earlier definitions. 
However, I believe that we should examine the real 
contents of relationships or structures from the view-
point of the concrete level of interactions in order to 
gain a better understanding of primate sociality. 
 
 
Dynamism of the Social World 
 
 The social world is always dynamic. This dyna-
mism attracts both researchers and children at the zoo 
toward primate society. However, at the same time, this 
dynamism makes it difficult for the observer to describe 
social phenomena. Researchers have to describe inter-
actions by using language (cf. Itani 1981); however, 
when we do so, the descriptions become static. This 
may be because although language itself is a dynamic 
system, written language used in such descriptions is 
usually static. 
 In the ethological sense, a behavior is determined 
by classifying the participants in an interaction as an 
active performer and a passive recipient, and the be-
havior is treated as if it belongs to the performer. We 
can use check-sheets to record particular social behav-
iors with one-zero sampling only because we discard 
the dynamic aspects of actual interactions and their 
relevance to the participants in each context. When we 
try to grasp the interaction without discarding its dy-
namism in reality, it sometimes results in long descrip-
tions of events that may be regarded as being too 
wordy. 
 For example, Mori (1994) conducted a “story 
analysis” on the social change process of bonobos at 
Wamba. Here, by a story he meant a description and its 
interpretation of consecutively occurring social events. 
When one pools multiple social interactions for qualita-
tive analysis, e.g., to calculate relative frequency, 
he/she assumes that each interaction is independent 
with each other. Instead, story analysis assumes that 
each events are not independent but in causal relation-
ships. By conducting this analysis, Mori attempted to 
substantiate the anthropomorphic expressions often 
seen in Japanese literature. 
 Itoh (2003) described the interactions constantly 
seen in the fission-fusion of chimpanzees in the Mahale 
Mountains. Although fission-fusion is regarded as 
 unique characteristics of chimpanzee societies, it is 
often considered only in relation to party size and 
composition (another construction that has been ana-
lyzed by researchers), which is not really fission-fusion 
but only an outcome of it. Itoh’s description is the first 
attempt to describe the ongoing mechanism of the dy-
namic fission-fusion phenomenon in chimpanzees. Her 
description indicates that although salient behaviors 
such as greeting or grooming do not always have to 
occur, slight movements involving individuals who 
meet and part always take place. She argued that what 
is observed as a contour of a group or a party is made 
through everlasting movements of interacting individu-
als and lags (neither perfect coordination nor complete 
irrelevance) among such movements. 
 Adachi (2003) raised the objection that the term 
“society” is commonly limited to individuals of one 
species. She described the mixed-species association of 
cercopithecid monkeys in the Taï Forest in order to 
discuss fission-fusion across species and their inter-
specific interactions. A mixed-species association does 
not result in a stable and constant social structure. In 
her study, Adachi attempts to adopt the autopoiesis 
theory of Kawamoto (1995) in order to describe such a 
fugitive, momentary and ephemeral aspects of a society 
(for English introduction to autopoiesis theory, see 
Maturana and Varela 1987). Although such 
non-structured (corresponding to Itani’s anti-structure) 
societies seen in mixed-species associations are often 
difficult to treat with our language because of their lack 
of structure, Adachi argues they are essential in under-
standing what is regarded “social” in primate studies. 
This is because what we actually experience as “social” 
in our everyday life is not often structured but rather 
non-structured as shown in the case of a child at the 
beginning. 
 Nishie (2008) studied the interactions of Mahale 
chimpanzees involved in arboreal ant fishing, and pro-
vided detailed descriptions of some events. Although 
ant fishing is usually regarded as cultural tool-use, Ni-
shie’s approach differed from that of current cultural 
studies or social learning theories of primates, which 
tacitly assume the transfer of information from a 
knowledgeable individual to an ignorant other. He re-
considered and deconstructed such transmission meta-
phors and instead introduced another epistemological 
standpoint, action-practice model. He described dy-
namics of the social practices at ant-fishing scenes, and 
by doing so, discussed that some characters such as 
attitude depending on others’ actions, moderate explor-
ing proposition to others, and direct reaction to such 
propositions, were important to realize such social 
situation of ant-fishing as a cultural practice of chim-
panzees. Such standpoint might widen the scope of 
cultural primatology: cultural behaviors represented by 
tool use should not be treated only as a relationship 
between the actor and the object (e.g., ants) connected 
with a tool. It should be reminded that each cultural 




Quality of Interactions 
 
 Strictly speaking, a phenomenon occurs only once; 
therefore, every phenomenon is unique. However, we 
usually categorize some interactions into certain types 
and develop appropriate terms for them. The labeled 
interactions that we identify can often occur in a similar 
fashion but differently in some contexts. 
 Sugawara (1980) studied the interactions of en-
counters among solitary male Japanese macaques at 
Koshima Islet. He found that “agonistic” interactions 
such as attack and mounting occurred more often in 
triads than in dyads. This shows that the occurrence of 
a particular type of interaction is dependent on the 
number of participants. Nakamura (2003), who studied 
chimpanzee grooming, also found such a difference: 
Males groomed more often in dyads and triads, whereas 
females groomed more often in polyads of more than 
five individuals. Although studies of social behavior 
usually treat polyadic interaction by splitting it into 
dyadic interactions and summarizing such decomposed 
dyadic interactions, the abovementioned studies imply 
that the number of participants at the scene affects at 
least the quality of interactions. 
 Similar types of interactions are often adopted in 
completely different contexts, for example, in play. 
Bateson (1955) observed that “two monkeys engaged in 
an interactive sequence of which the unit actions or 
signals were similar to but not the same as those of 
combat.” Although biting and hitting may be observed 
in play, “the playful nip denotes the bite, but it does not 
denote what would be denoted by the bite.” Inspired by 
Bateson’s theory, Hayaki conducted studies on social 
play and other interactions among immature Japanese 
monkeys (Hayaki 1983) and chimpanzees (Hayaki 
1985; 1990). 
 Another example may be sexual interaction that is 
not directly connected to reproduction. Kitamura 
(1986) referred to interactions involving 
non-reproductive genital contacts in bonobos as “fic-
tional” (“kari no mono” in Japanese, for which there is 
no appropriate equivalent word in English). In this case, 
fictional implies that the behaviors acquire different 
characteristics although they still possess their original 
functions. Bonobo sexual behaviors are closely related 
to their original function of reproduction; however, 
such behaviors are often used outside the reproductive 
context. Thus, Kitamura argued that the analysis based 
on interactions as fictional occurrences should inevita-
bly be separated from causal or psychological motive 
theory, and the focus should be shifted to the analysis 
of its formal characteristics. 
 The abovementioned studies often do not rely on 
quantitative data only but instead often employ analy-
ses of events or stories. In addition, because each au-
thor employs her/his own original style of discourse, it 
is not easy to summarize the common features of these 
studies. However, the studies seem to share the same 
stance, namely, viewing society as a contingent and 
dynamic phenomenon rather than as a deterministic 
 world. Therefore, when these researchers use quantita-
tive data, their categorization is often more subtle than 
usual, and they tend to provide more than the usual 
amount of data required for answering a particular 
question, in an attempt to describe the variations ob-
served in various scenes. Standard researchers often 
consider such tendencies to be redundant and difficult 
to understand because such studies are not the usual 
hypothesis-testing ones. 
 Such a descriptive style of research is more com-
mon in social sciences such as cultural and social an-
thropology or ethnomethodology. However, although 
primatology also deals with society, there are very few 
descriptive studies recently in the West. An exception is 
the study by King (2004), who emphasized dynamic 
system theory, nonlinear thinking, and qualitative re-
search. Although the subtitle of this book is “nonvocal 
communication in African great apes,” the use of 
communication is not as narrow as the conventional 
sense, in which case it is almost equivalent to the 
transfer of information from one individual to another. 
In her study, King uses communication to refer to the 
more dynamic, ever-changing, and emergent property 
of social interactions. A similar wider view with regard 
to communication is also expressed and explored by 
Japanese primatologists (e.g., Kitamura 1988; Hayaki 
1988; Takahata 1997). Kitamura (1990) emphasized the 
importance of interactional synchrony as the funda-
mental basis for communication and tried to further 
elaborate his idea (Kitamura 1996, 1999) in order to 
connect communication among nonhuman primates to 
that among humans.  
 
 
Problems and Critiques 
 
 As mentioned above, primate interaction studies in 
Japan attempt to approach primate sociality by placing 
greater emphasis on qualitative descriptions of interac-
tions. This does not imply that such studies do not 
conduct quantitative analyses. In my understanding, 
currently, the only way to understand the niceties of 
interactions is through minute and careful description. 
However, as discussed above, descriptive researches do 
not permit easy generalizations because of the nature of 
the individuality of phenomena. This was perhaps a 
difficult point to accept in the current field of evolu-
tionary ecology, which usually aims at concise theori-
zation and generalization of phenomena in the world of 
animals. Earlier, Japanese primatology easily transgress 
the methodological agreement of natural sciences and 
even employed the methodologies in social science. 
This practice was repeatedly criticized even within 
Japan. For example, in the very early stages of Japanese 
primatology, Sasaki (1956) made the following criti-
cism: “It seems to me that some of the basic concepts 
formed by social scientists in the course of studying 
human society have been too easily applied to natural 
society (of monkeys)” (my translation). Similarly, more 
than four decades later, Muroyama (1998) also offered 
a similar criticism: “The fundamental problem of tradi-
tional Japanese primatology is the application of meth-
odology or concepts of sociology or cultural anthro-
pology to nonhuman primates” (my translation). 
 Such critiques are valid in the sense of austerity that 
we should not easily employ anthropomorphism. 
However, when we deal with the dynamism and quality 
of social interactions and societies, some methodolo-
gies of social sciences can be of help. But why are such 
methodologies permitted to only one species of pri-
mates? When we try to observe the continuities of so-
cial phenomena among primates, why must we have to 
adhere to the distinction of human and nonhuman? Is 
this not another form of anthropocentrism? Of course, 
we cannot directly apply the methods of sociology or 
cultural anthropology. It is plain that researchers greatly 
depend on information obtained from verbal report in 
such study domains, whereas primatologists can never 
ask their targets a question. When Itani (1985a) argued 
that studies of primates need “not necessarily rely on 
biological and reductionistic approaches but can estab-
lish original and unique methodologies and theories as 
a social science,” he may have been thinking beyond 
simple anthropomorphism. 
 Lack of theory was also criticized within the field 
of Japanese primatology: “As primatology has flour-
ished worldwide and novelty has decreased, it should 
be emphasized that we are at a deadlock because of the 
lack of theory in Japanese primatology” (Takahata 1994, 
my translation). With respect to the lack of theory, de 
Waal (2003) defended Japanese primatologists; how-
ever, it may be true that Japanese primatology could not 
present a theory in Sibatani’s (1999) sense, namely, 
allowing its followers to investigate and mass-produce 
articles within the framework without considering the 
validity of the framework itself. This should be under-
stood within the context that in the Kyoto School: theo-
ries that were easily followed by many people were of 
little account; instead, it was demanded that each indi-
vidual researcher establish his/her own research theory 
from his/her own observation. Recently, Japanese re-
searchers have begun more easily to accept and to fol-
low dominant theories such as sociobiology and socio-
ecology. 
 However, original theoretical considerations about 
the sociality of nonhuman primates in relation to hu-
mans also exist in Japan: Kitamura (1982; 2002) treated 
the concept of incest avoidance observed in nonhuman 
primates with respect to the famous theory by 
Lévi-Strauss; he also discussed the origin of language 
in connection with nonhuman communication (Kita-
mura 1999). Yamagiwa (1994) discussed the origin of 
the human family from the perspective of gorilla socie-
ties; similarly, Sugawara (2002) has argued about the 
emotional connection of primates and humans; and 
Kuroda, who had studied food sharing among bonobos 
(Kuroda 1984), developed his idea to explore the origin 
of social rules or institutions without language (Kuroda 
1999). 
 These theoretical considerations in addition to those 
by Imanishi and Itani (see above) are not easy to under-
stand, and it should be noted that these researchers 
 sometimes employed terms that were not from the field 
of biology and sometimes created their own terminol-
ogy. It should also be noted that it is not very easy to 
theorize about purely social phenomena. This is related 
to the fact that in human sociology, there is no single 
central theoretical framework to explain the diverse 
social phenomena. Because researchers themselves are 
a part of society and because their research is closely 
connected to society, the research becomes 




Toward Understanding Dynamic Sociality 
 
 Today, the original and traditional Japanese prima-
tology is losing status. In the name of globalization, 
Japanese students are guided to write their first scien-
tific paper in English and many of them do so (also see 
Asquith 2000). Writing papers in English is useful for 
attaining a wide range of readership and to expand 
beyond the narrow academic world of Japan. However, 
since students do this without fully considering the 
underlying theoretical background, and many of them 
simply write papers that adhere to global trends. It ap-
pears that the abstruseness of the East is now being 
eradicated; however, at the same time, the unique and 
original views of the East are also disappearing. 
 Although it may not be a time to make a claim re-
garding the uniqueness of Japanese primatology, the 
differences in language and cultural background still 
remain. In particular, it is difficult to describe minute 
and subtle social interactions in languages other than 
one’s mother tongue. Descriptions that are originally 
rich in Japanese, once translated into English, can often 
become platitudes and/or simplistic (Mori 1994) if the 
writer does not have excellent English language skills. 
Some quantitative data by Japanese primatologists may 
be evaluated to an extent; however, ideas such as direct 
focus on interaction itself are rarely understood by 
global academics. Unless they receive such acceptance 
(which implies that such papers may not be accepted in 
international journals), few researchers are seriously 
willing to study such phenomena. I hope that this paper 
has been able to express, even to a limited extent, some 
of the epistemology of interaction studies in Japanese 
primatology, which is not part of the mainstream and 
continues to be sidelined. 
 If we accept that primates are social beings, prima-
tology does not have to limit itself to biology (Itani 
1985a), one of the natural sciences, or such a limit 
should not be applicable with regard to the understand-
ing of some aspects of primate sociality. Although there 
is an increase in the evolutionary understanding of hu-
man behaviors and societies (e.g., Barkow et al. 1992), 
few researchers would insist that human societies and 
sociality can be understood only in the context of biol-
ogy. It is possible to have an academic domain for the 
study of sociality in primatology or even in zoology. 
 Scholars are now beginning to accept that primates 
and other nonhuman animals have their own cultures 
(e.g., McGrew 2004) and have proposed terms such as 
“cultural primatology” (de Waal 1999) and primate 
“ethnography” (Wrangham et al. 1994). In such a do-
main of studies, methods or concepts outside of biology 
are sometimes employed and some descriptive studies 
are permitted. Because primatologists understand the 
richness of each primate society, it may be time to fo-




The study was financially supported in part by grants from 
Japanese MEXT (#16255007, #19255008 to T Nishida and 
#16770186 to MN) and the Global Environment Research 
Fund (F-061) of the Ministry of the Environment, Japan. I 
thank Drs. Akio Mori, William C. McGrew, Toshisada Nishida, 
and an anonymous reviewer for their constructive comments 





Adachi K (2003) Mixed-species association as a society. In: 
Nishida M, Kitamura K, Yamagiwa J (eds) Origin and evo-
lution of humanity. Shôwadô, Kyoto, pp 204–282, in Japa-
nese 
Asquith P (2000) Negotiating science: internationalization and 
Japanese primatology. In: Strum SC, Fedigan LM (eds) Pri-
mate encounters: models of science, gender, and society. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 165–183 
Asquith PJ (2002) Introduction. In: A Japanese view of nature: 
the world of living things by Kinji Imanishi. Routledge 
Curzon, New York, pp. xxix–l. 
Barkow JH, Cosmides L, Tooby J (eds) (1992) The adapted 
mind: evolution psychology and the generation of culture. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Bateson G (1955/1972) A theory of play and fantasy: a report 
of theoretical aspects of the project for study of the role of 
paradoxes of abstraction in communication. Reprinted in: 
Steps to an ecology of mind. The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 
Boesch C (2003) Is culture a golden barrier between human 
and chimpanzee? Evol Anthropol 12:82–91 
Bygott JD (1979) Agonistic behavior, dominance, and social 
structure in wild chimpanzees of Gombe National Park. In: 
Hamburg DA, McCown ER (eds) The great apes. Benja-
min/Cummings, Menlo Park, pp 405–427 
Foley RA (1996) An evolutionary and chronological frame-
work for human social behaviour. Proc Br Acad 88:5–117 
Furuichi T (1999) Evolution of sex and human evolution: from 
observation of bonobos. Asahi Sensho, Tokyo, in Japanese 
Furuichi T (2006) Evolution of the social structure of homi-
noids: reconsideration of food distribution and the estrus sex 
ratio. In: Ishida H, Tuttle R, Pickford M, Ogihara N, Naka-
tsukasa M (eds) Human origins and environmental back-
grounds. Springer, New York, pp 235–248 
Goodall J (1971) In the shadow of man. Collins, London 
Hayaki H (1983) The social interactions of juvenile Japanese 
monkeys on Koshima islet. Primates 24:139–53 
Hayaki H (1985) Social play of juvenile and adolescent chim-
panzees in the Mahale Mountains National Park, Tanzania. 
 Primates 26:343–360 
Hayaki H (1988) Considering chimpanzee communication. 
Seibutsu Kagaku 40:131–139, in Japanese 
Hayaki H (1990) The human within the chimpanzee. Shôkabô, 
Tokyo, in Japanese 
Hinde RA (1976) Interactions, relationships and social struc-
ture. Man 11:1–17 
Imanishi K (1941/2002) The world of living things. Chûko 
Classics, Tokyo, in Japanese 
Imanishi K (1951) Society before humans. Imawami, Tokyo, 
in Japanese 
Imanishi K (1952) Evolution of humanity. In: Imanishi K (ed) 
Man. Mainichi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, pp 36–94, in Japanese 
Imanishi K (1957) Identification: a process of enculturation in 
the subhuman society of Macaca fuscata. Primates 1:1–29 
Imanishi K (1960) Gorilla. Bungeishunju-shinsha, Tokyo, in 
Japanese 
Imanishi K (1966) Formation of human society. NHK Books, 
Tokyo, in Japanese 
Itani J (1954/1971) Monkeys of Takasakiyama, Shisakusha, in 
Japanese 
Itani J (1977) Evolution of primate social structure. J Hum 
Evol 6:235–243 
Itani J (1980a) Social structures of African great apes. J Re-
prod Fertil Suppl 28:33–41 
Itani J (1980b) Natural history of Turkana: inexorable people. 
Yûzankaku, Tokyo, in Japanese 
Itani J (1981/1987) Behaviors that make social structure. Re-
printed in: Evolution of primate societies. Heibonsha, Tokyo, 
pp 223?245, in Japanese 
Itani J (1985a) Japanese primatology in retrospect and in 
prospect. Primate Res 1:5–14, in Japanese 
Itani J (1985b) The evolution of primate social structures. Man 
20:593–611 
Itani J (1986) Discourse on the origin of equality. In: Itani J, 
Tanaka J (eds) Anthropology of Natural Societies. Academia 
Shuppankai, Kyoto, pp 349–389, in Japanese 
Itani J (1987) Evolution of primate societies. Heibonsha, To-
kyo, in Japanese 
Itani J (1988) Towards new theory of communication. Kikan 
Jinruigaku 19(1):95–111 
Itani J (1990) Mercy of nature. Heibonsha, Tokyo, in Japanese 
Itani J (1991/1993) Structure and anti-structure of a society. 
Reprinted in: When nature smiles. Heibonsha, Tokyo, pp 
187–217, in Japanese 
Itani J, Nishimura A (1973) The study of infrahuman culture in 
Japan. In: Menzel EW (ed) Precultural primate behavior. 
Karger, Basel, pp 26–50 
Itani J, Terashima H (2001) Vegetation map of Africa: pro-
posal of a tentative idea. Human and Culture 15:15–18, in 
Japanese 
Itoh N (2003) Dynamics of gathering. In: Nishida M, Kita-
mura K, Yamagiwa J (eds) Origin and evolution of humanity, 
Shôwadô, Kyoto, pp 233–262, in Japanese 
Kano T (1982) The social group of pygmy chimpanzees (Pan 
paniscus) of Wamba. Primates 23:171–188 
Kauffman S (1995/1999) At home in the universe: the search 
for laws of self organization and complexity (Japanese edi-
tion). Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, Tokyo 
Kawai M (1965) Newly-acquired pre-cultural behavior of the 
natural troop of Japanese monkeys of Koshima Islet. Pri-
mates 6:1–30 
Kawamoto H (1995) Autopoiesis: the third generation system. 
Seidosha, Tokyo, in Japanese 
Kawamura S (1959) The process of sub-culture propagation 
among Japanese macaques. Primates 2:43–60 
King BJ (2004) The dynamic dance: nonvocal communication 
in African great apes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass. 
Kitamura K (1982) Solution to incest puzzle: Lévi-Strauss’ 
theory viewed from primatology. Shisô 693:56–71, in Japa-
nese 
Kitamura K (1986) Pygmy chimpanzees: their ‘fictional’ 
world in the gathering. In: Itani J, Tanaka J (eds) Anthro-
pology of natural societies. Academia Shuppankai, Kyoto, 
pp 43–70 in Japanese 
Kitamura K (1988) What is communication? Kikan Jinruigaku 
19(1):40–49, in Japanese 
Kitamura K (1990) Interactional synchrony: a fundamental 
condition for communication. Senri Ethnol Stud 27:123–140 
Kitamura K (1996) Evolution of human communication and 
its two themes: ‘accordance with others’ and ‘accordance 
with reality’. Bunkei Ronsô of Hirosaki University 
31:139–166, in Japanese 
Kitamura K (1999) ‘Evolution of language’ viewed from 
communication. Studies in the Humanities (Cultural Sci-
ence) of Hirosaki University 2:45–70, in Japanese 
Kitamura K (2002) Reconstruction of “origin of family the-
ory”: interlocution with theory by Lévi-Strauss. In: Nishida 
M, Kitamura K, Yamagiwa J (eds) Origin and evolution of 
humanity. Shôwadô, Kyoto, pp 2–30, in Japanese 
Kuroda S (1979) Grouping of the pygmy chimpanzees. Pri-
mates 20:161–183 
Kuroda S (1984) Interaction over food among pygmy chim-
panzees. In: Susman RL (ed) The pygmy chimpanzee: evo-
lutionary biology and behavior. Plenum Press, New York, pp 
301–324 
Kuroda S (1986) From the whole to the part. In: Asada A, 
Kuroda S, Sawa T, Nagano K, Yamaguchi M (eds) What is 
scientific method. Chûko Shinsho, Tokyo, pp 49–72, in 
Japanese 
Kuroda S (1999) Reconsidering human evolution. Ibunsha, 
Tokyo, in Japanese 
Matsuzawa T, McGrew WC (2008) Kinji Imanishi and 60 
years of Japanese primatology. Curr Biol 18:R587–R591 
Maturana HR, Varela FJ (1987) The tree of knowledge: The 
biological roots of human understanding. Shambhala Publi-
cations, Boston 
McGrew WC (2004) The cultured chimpanzee: reflections on 
cultural primatology. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 
McGrew WC (2007) Mahale and Gombe compared: patterns 
of research on wild chimpanzees in Tanzania over four dec-
ades. Afr Study Monogr 28:143–153 
Mori A (1994) The meaning of agonistic behavior in a wild 
group of bonobos (Pan paniscus): a use of story analysis. 
Primate Res 10:229–251, in Japanese with English summary 
Muroyama Y (1998) Another “primatology today”. Seibutsu 
Kagaku 50:193–204, in Japanese 
Nakamura M (2003) ‘Gatherings’ of social grooming among 
wild chimpanzees: implications for evolution of sociality. J 
Hum Evol 44:59–71 
 Nakamura M (in press) Ubiquity of culture and a possibility of 
social inheritance of sociality among wild chimpanzees, In: 
Lonsdorf EV, Ross SR, Matsuzawa T (eds) The mind of the 
chimpanzee: ecological and experimental perspectives. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
Nakamura M, Nishida T (2006) Subtle behavioral variation in 
wild chimpanzees, with special reference to Imanishi’s con-
cept of kaluchua. Primates 47:35–42 
Nisbett RE (2003/2004) The geography of thought: how 
Asians and Westerners think differently.... and why (Japa-
nese edition). Diamond-sha, Tokyo 
Nishida T (1966) A sociological study of solitary male mon-
keys. Primates 7:141–204 
Nishida T (1968) The social group of wild chimpanzees in the 
Mahali Mountains. Primates 9:167–224 
Nishida T (1973) The children of the mountain spirits: in 
search for the social structure of chimpanzees. Chikuma 
Shobô, in Japanese 
Nishida T (1987) Local traditions and cultural transmission. 
In: Smuts BB, Cheney DL, Seyfarth RM, Wrangham RW, 
Struhsaker TT (eds) Primate societies. University of Chi-
cago Press, Chicago, pp 462–74 
Nishie H (2008) Chimpanzee culture and sociality: reconsid-
ering “the metaphor of transmission of knowledge.” Primate 
Res 24:73–90, in Japanese with English summary 
Rendall D, Di Fore A (1995) The road less traveled: phyloge-
netic perspectives in primatology. Evol Anthropol 4:43–52 
Rendell L, Whitehead H (2001) Culture in whales and dol-
phins. Behav Brain Sci 24:309–382 
Rousseau JJ (1755/1972) Discours sur l’origine de l’inegalite 
parmi les hommes. Iwanami Bunko, Tokyo, Japanese edition 
Sasaki A (1956) A doubt about methodology. Shizen 
11(12):7–8, in Japanese 
Sawaguchi T, Kudo H (1987) Evolutionary theories on primate 
social structures and behaviors. Primate Res 3:48–58, in 
Japanese with English summary 
van Schaik CP, Deaner RO, Merrill MY (1999) The conditions 
for tool use in primates: implications for the evolution of 
material culture. J Hum Evol 36:719–741 
van Schaik CP, van Hoof JARAM (1983) On the ultimate 
causes of primate social systems. Behaviour 85:91–117 
Sibatani A (1999) Structuralistic biology. University Press of 
Tokyo, Tokyo, in Japanese 
Sterck EHM, Watts DP, van Schaik CP (1997) The evolution 
of female social relationships in nonhuman primates. Behav 
Ecol Sociobiol 41:291–309 
Sugawara K (1980) Structure of social encounter among 
non-troop males of Japanese macaques. Kikan Jinruigaku 
11:3–76, in Japanese 
Sugawara K (2002) Emotional ape=man. Kôbunsha, Tokyo, in 
Japanese 
Sugiyama Y (2000) Looking back Japanese primatology to 
find a way to the future. In: Sugiyama Y (ed) Primate ecol-
ogy. Kyoto University Press, Kyoto, pp 451–472, in Japa-
nese 
Sugiyama Y, Koman J (1979) Social structure and dynamics of 
wild chimpanzees at Bossou, Guinea. Primates 20:323–339 
Takahata Y (1994) Only yesterday: reviewing the Japanese 
primatology of the 1980s and the future. Primate Res 
10:181–189, in Japanese with English summary 
Takahata Y (1997) Monkey talk or what we learned about 
‘how monkeys communicate’. In: Tani Y (ed) Natural his-
tory of communication. Shin’yôsha, Tokyo, pp 61–82, in 
Japanese 
Takasaki H (1999) Methodology in primatology. In: Nishida T, 
Uehara S (eds) For those who study primatology. 
Sekaishisôsha, pp 327–347, in Japanese 
Takasaki H (2000) Traditions of the Kyoto school of field 
primatology in Japan. In: Strum SC, Fedigan LM (eds) Pri-
mate encounters: models of science, gender, and society. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 151–164 
de Waal FBM (1999) Cultural primatology comes of age. 
Nature 399:635–636 
de Waal F (2001) The ape and the sushi master: cultural re-
flections of a primatologist. Basic Books, New York 
de Waal FBM (2003) Silent invasion: Imanishi’s primatology 
and cultural bias in science. Anim Cogn 6:293–299 
Wikipedia (2008a) Interaction. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Interaction, accessed on 12 June 2008 
Wikipedia (2008b) Social interaction. http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Social_interaction, accessed on 12 June 2008 
Wrangham RW (1980) An ecological model of female-bonded 
primate groups. Behaviour 75:262–300 
Wrangham RW, de Waal FBM, McGrew WC (1994) The 
challenge of behavioral diversity. In: Wrangham RW, 
McGrew WC, de Waal FBM, Heltne PG (eds) Chimpanzee 
cultures. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp 
1–18 
Yamagiwa J (1987) Intra- and inter-group interactions of an 
all-male group of Virunga mountain gorillas (Gorilla gorilla 
beringei) Primates 28:1–30 
Yamagiwa J (1994) Origin of family: emergence of fatherhood. 
University of Tokyo Press, in Japanese 
Yamagiwa J (1999) Socioecological factors influencing popu-
lation structure of gorillas and chimpanzees. Primates 
40:87–104 
